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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE VERSUS THE PTO'S
DUTY OF CANDOR: RESOLVING THE CLASH IN
SIMULTANEOUS-PATENT REPRESENTATIONS
Todd M. Becker
Abstract Patent attorneys play dual roles: they are simultaneously attorneys and patent
practitioners. Their dual role causes problems when the rules that govern one role conflict
with the rules that govern the other. One such problem is illustrated in Molins PLC v. Textron,
Inc., where a patent attorney simultaneously representing two clients was caught between the
Patent & Trademark Office's duty of candor and the attorney's duty of confidentiality
imposed by the rules of professional responsibility. The Molins decision presents a problem
because it creates uncertainty about whether confidentiality can be maintained by using the
attorney-client privilege to defeat the duty of candor. This Comment examines the contours of
the duty of candor and the attorney-client privilege, concludes that in some situations there is
a conflict between the two, and argues that, when a conflict does exist policy considerations
dictate that the attorney-client privilege override the duty of candor.
Technology has become a ubiquitous part of life. The rapid pace of
technological development-particularly in fields such as electronics,
computers, and biotechnology-brings us products that become more
capable all the time. As technology becomes more capable it also
becomes more complex, and in response the inventors who develop it
become more technically specialized. Driven by the increasing
specialization of inventors, patent attorneys to whom the inventors turn
for legal protection of their inventions also are becoming more
technically specialized. Consequently, patent attorneys who develop a
reputation for expertise in a certain technical area and a sizable client
base increasingly will prosecute patent applications in the same or
closely related technical fields. This will be particularly true in fields
such as biotechnology, where qualified practitioners are rare, and in
geographic areas where particular types of industries are concentrated,
such as the semiconductor chip industry in the Silicon Valley of
California.
As patent attorneys become more technically specialized and
prosecute more closely related patent applications, they may encounter
problems with legal rules that are often slow to catch up with the realities
of practice. A recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit,% ' Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc.,2 illustrates one of the
1. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, formed in 1982 by joining the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims, exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
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problems patent attorneys may face. In Molins, a patent attorney was
caught between two conflicting rules. The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office3 (PTO) places a duty of candor upon patent attorneys, which
requires disclosure of any information that is material to a patent
application.4 Failure to disclose material information can be deemed
"inequitable conduct" and can carri severe penalties for both the attorney
and the client. At the same time, the rules of professional responsibility
subject attorneys to a duty of confidentiality, which requires them to
protect all information relating to a client's representation by asserting
the attorney-client privilege when necessary and proper. The attorney in
Molins represented two clients simultaneously and faced a dilemma
because information from the first client was allegedly material to the
second client's patent application. Thus, the attorney had to choose
between asserting attorney-client privilege on behalf of the first client
and complying with the duty of candor on behalf of the second. The
court resolved the dispute on other grounds, but in dicta split three ways
about whether the duty of candor should override the attorney-client
privilege.
The uncertainty created by the Molins split places patert attorneys in a
precarious position where they must guess whether attorney-client
privilege will override the duty of candor. If the privilege does not
override the duty of candor and the attorney withholds information from
the PTO thinking that it does, the duty of candor is breached5 and the
attorney risks PTO disciplinary action and unenforceability of the
client's patent. If the privilege does override the duty of candor and the
attorney discloses client information thinking it does not, then the duty of
confidentiality6 is violated and the attorney risks malpractice and
disciplinary action by the bar association. This issue should be resolved
because attorneys need to know whether the privilege applies in
simultaneous representation, so that they may protect thelaselves and the
interests of their clients.
This Comment argues that, in a simultaneous representation like the
one in Molins, the Federal Circuit should allow the attorney-client
claims under or related to the patent laws. Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jazobs, Understanding
Intellectual Property Law 2-17 to 2-18 (1992).
2. 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
3. The PTO is an office of the Department of Commerce, an administrative agency of the U.S.
Federal Government. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
4. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1995).
5. See discussion infra part I.C.
6. See discussion infra part II.A.1.
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privilege to override the duty of candor. Part I gives an overview of
patent prosecution and enforcement of patent rights, and examines the
law and policy of the duty of candor. Part H discusses the law and policy
of attorney-client privilege and how it has been applied in the context of
patent prosecution. Finally, part III analyzes the simultaneous
representation case in terms of the duty of candor and attorney-client
privilege, and suggests various policy reasons why attorney-client
privilege should override the duty of candor in such a case.
I. PATENT PROSECUTION AND THE DUTY OF CANDOR
Proceedings relating to patents fall into two categories. The first
category includes proceedings before the PTO, collectively referred to as
patent "prosecution,"7 that focus on obtaining a patent. Prosecution
begins when a patent application is filed with the PTO and ends when the
patent is issued or the application is finally rejected. The second category
includes proceedings in the federal courts, referred to as "patent
litigation," that focus on enforcing or extinguishing existing patent
rights. Usually, patent litigation arises when the patentee seeks to stop
infringement of the patent or an opponent seeks to have the patent
invalidated. The steps in patent prosecution, patent litigation, and the
application of the duty of candor during prosecution are described below.
A. Overview of Patent Prosecution
Patent prosecution consists essentially of two steps: the initial
examination and proceedings following the initial examination.
1. The Initial Examination
The first step in seeking patent protection for an invention is to
prepare a patent application that claims the particular aspects of the
invention for which patent protection is sought.' The application then is
filed with the PTO, where it is assigned to a patent examiner for review.
The examiner must do two things with the application. First, the
7. See generally 3 Donald S. Chisum, Patents: A Treatise on the Lmv of Patentability, Validity
and Infringement § 11.03 (1996) (describing prosecution of patent applications).
8. The patent statutes prescribe four elements for a complete application: a specification,
including at least one claim; drawings, if necessary; the inventor's oath or declaration; and a filing
fee. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2D[3], at 2-129 to 2-130.
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examiner must search for prior arte in the field of the invention. Having
completed a prior art search, the examiner must decide whether the
invention, as claimed in the application, is patentable in light of prior art
submitted by the applicant and any references uncovered during the
examiner's own prior art search.'"
Contrary to most administrative proceedings, in a patent prosecution
the burden of proof is on the examiner to show that the invention should
not be patented, rather than on the inventor to prove that it should be
patented." The examiner can meet the burden of proof with a showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the invention either fails to meet
one of the statutory criteria for patentability, or that the patent is barred
by one of the "statutory bars." There are four statutory criteria of
patentability: patentable subject matter 2 utility,13 novelty, 4 and non-
obviousness. 5  The subject matter and utility requirements are
straightforward and are usually easily met, but establishing novelty and
non-obviousness of the invention is more difficult. Novelty requires that
the invention not be anticipated by the prior art; anticipation occurs when
all the claimed features of the invention are found in a ,single prior art
reference. 6 Non-obviousness is a separate inquiry from novelty. An
invention is obvious and cannot be patented if, at the time the invention
was made, the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
9. "Prior art" is a term of art in patent law. It refers to the body of pre-existing knowledge and
technology with which the new invention is compared to determine whether it is novel or non-
obvious. Thus, an invention need not be "novel" and "non-obvious" in the abstract; it must be
"novel" and "non-obvious" as compared to the prior art. See generally Chisum & Jacobs, supra note
1, § 2C[5]. The examiners are required to do their own prior art search. 37 C.FR. § 1.104(a) (1995).
10. The patent statutes provide some guidance as to what may be considered rrior art for purposes
of novelty. Prior art includes inventions patented or described in publications anywhere in the world,
and matter "known or used" by others in the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); patent
applications filed by persons other than the inventor before the filing of the application in question,
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1994); and prior inventions in the United States by other persons, 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(g) (1994). The patent statutes do not expressly define prior art for obviousness, but this seems
to include at least all the items that may be considered for establishing novelty. See generally
Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2C[5], at 2-83 to 2-85 (discussing scope of what may be
considered prior art).
11. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J., concurring); In re Warner, 379
F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968).
12. The invention must be a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994).
13. § 101. To possess utility, an invention need only be operable and capable of performing some
function of benefit to humanity. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2C[2], at 2-50.
14. §§ 101, 102(a).
15. § 103 (1994).
16. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2C[3], at 2-52 to 2-53.
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art would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which the invention pertains. 7
Even if the invention meets the four patentability requirements, the
patent still may be defeated by the "statutory bars,"'" which prevent
patenting of inventions that have been in the public domain long enough
for the public to have come to rely on their free availability. 9 The
statutory bars forbid patenting in two situations. First, a patent is
forbidden if the invention has been patented or described in a printed
publication anywhere in the world more than one year before the date the
application was filed."0 Second, a patent is forbidden if the invention was
"on sale" or "in public use" in the United States2' more than one year
prior to the date the patent application was filed.
2. Procedure Subsequent to Initial Examination
Following the initial examination, the patent examiner enters an
"office action" that serves several functions: cites the most relevant prior
art resulting from the search; indicates allowance or rejection of each
claim in the application in light of the prior art; cites the statutory basis
for each claim rejected along with pertinent prior art and comments; and
sets a time period for response.2 If the office action is favorable, the
patent proceeds to issuance. If the office action is adverse, the patent
attorney either can abandon the application or proceed with prosecution.
If the prosecution proceeds, the attorney can amend relevant portions of
the application, present further factual information supporting
patentability, or attempt to distinguish prior art cited by the examiner in
rejecting the claims.2 In such a case, the application is resubmitted to the
PTO where the examiner re-evaluates the application and makes another
17. § 103; Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2C[4], at 2-56.
18. § 102(b) (1994).
19. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1986).
20. § 102(b); see also Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2C[5].
21. Public use or on-sale activity of an invention by anyone, with or without the consent or
kmowledge of the applicant claiming a patent for the invention, constitutes a statutory bar to the
receipt of a patent. Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 19-20 (1939); Andrews v.
Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 718-19 (1888); Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 167 F.2d 423, 429 (3d
Cir. 1948).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) (1995); 37 C.F.R. § 1.106; Chisum & Jacobs,
supra note 1, § 2D[I], at 2-106.
23. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2D1l], at 2-105.
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decision. This cycle can be repeated several times, althoua current PTO
practice makes the second rejection final in most cases.24
Examination usually is considered an ex parte proceeding. Until the
examiner's first office action the proceeding is truly ex parte, as the
attorney is prohibited from contacting the examiner.' Following the first
office action, the proceeding takes on more of an adversarial character:
the attorney can contact the examiner by phone or ia person, can
correspond actively with the examiner, and can argue with the examiner
about the patentability of the invention.26 The examiner can demand
proof of assertions made, narrowing of patent claims, and explanations of
prior art.27
B. Patent Litigation
Patent litigation takes place in federal court28 and in most respects is
like any other type of litigation. Patent suits can arise in two ways:
through an infringement suit or through an invalidation action. In an
infingement suit, the patentee accuses another party of infringement and
usually demands damages and injunctive relief in the form of an order to
cease infringement. The alleged infringer may assert as a defense that
there is no infringement, that it has a license on the patent, that the patent
is invalid, or that the patent is unenforceable because of inequitable
conduct before the PTO during prosecution.29 In an. invalidation
proceeding, an actual or potential infringer seeks to absolve itself of
liability by having the patent declared invalid for technical reasons or
unenforceable because of inequitable conduct during prosecution.
24. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113(a) (1995); Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2D[1], at 2-107 n.21.
25. 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(a) (1995).
26. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, § 2D1[], at 2-106 to 2-107.
27. Id.
28. The federal government exercises exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patents. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994), Patent trials may take place in any federal district
court, but all patent appeals must be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent matters. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (1994);
see also Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 2-17 to 2-18.
29. See generally 5 Chisum, supra note 7, § 19.03 (discussing defenses to patent infringement
related to fraudulent procurement).
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C. The PTO's Duty of Candor
1. Elements of the Duty of Candor
Attorneys prosecuting patents are subject to the PTO's Rule 56, which
prescribes a duty of candor towards the PTO:
Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing
with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to
patentability .... 30
This deceptively simple rule has several elements that require
elaboration, including its scope, its definition of materiality, its duration,
and the persons to whom the duty applies.
The scope of the duty of candor is not as broad as it seems on first
reading. The duty of candor does not require disclosure of all
information relevant to the application and creates no affirmative duty to
search for material information; it only requires disclosure of information
known by the applicant to both exist and be material. The standard is
not a should-have-known standard; actual knowledge of the information
and its materiality is necessary.3" To breach the duty, a failure to disclose
must be intentional and not merely negligent or grossly negligent,33 but
the necessary level of intent varies with the materiality of the
information. a
The second important element of the duty of candor is the definition
of materiality. 5 This definition has gone through several incarnations,
including the objective and subjective "but for" standards 36 and the
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1995).
31. FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987); American Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984); 57 Fed. Reg. 2025 (1992); 56 Fed. Reg. 37,322 (proposed Aug. 6, 1991).
32. 37 C.F.RL § 1.56(a); 57 Fed. Reg. 2022 (1992).
33. 37 C.F.RL § 1.56(a); Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867,
876 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
34. American Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1363.
35. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1995).
36. Under the objective "but for" standard, information was material if a reasonable examiner
would not have issued the patent but for the omission of the information. The subjective "but for"
defines information as material if that particular examiner would not have issued the patent but for
the omission. See 5 Chisum, supra note 7, § 19.03[3][a] (discussing judicially developed materiality
tests).
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"relevant to a reasonable examiner" standard.37 The latest PTO definition
establishes two tests for materiality. First, information is material if it is
not cumulative" and establishes a prima facie case of unpatentability39
before the introduction of rebuttal information. Second, information is
material if it is not cumulative and is inconsistent with a position taken
by the applicant before the PTO." Thus, if the applicant opposes an
argument of unpatentability or asserts an argument of patentability, the
information must be consistent with the argument; if it is not, the
information is material. The PTO recognizes that in th- course of a
patent prosecution a practitioner will have to make good fiith judgments
on materiality,4 ' but the office encourages disclosure when there is
doubt42 and reserves the ultimate determination of materiality to itself.43
The third and fourth important elements of the duty of candor are its
duration and the people to whom it applies. The duty applies throughout
the entire prosecution, from initial contact with the PTO until issuance of
the patent, and applies to all claims in the patent that are not canceled or
abandoned.' If a breach of the duty occurs during proseculion, it may be
cured under certain circumstances if disclosure is made to the PTO
before issuance of the patent.'4 The duty of candor applies to all people
37. Under this standard, information was material ifa reasonable examiner would have considered
it relevant in evaluating the patent. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Lid., 747 F.2d 1553,
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985); see also 5 Chisum, supra note 7,
§ 19.03[3][a].
38. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b). Information is cumulative if it is substantially the same as information
already in the record or being made of record in connection with the patent application. 57 Fed. Reg.
2022 (1992). The rule thus prevents unnecessary duplication of information.
39. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1). What constitutes a prima facie case of unpatentability is unclear.
Presumably, material information either prima faie negates one of the four sta.utory patentability
requirements or prima facie establishes one of the statutory bars. See discussioa supra part I.A.1.
Prima facie unpatentability is determined using the preponderance of the eviden,.e standard, giving
each term its broadest possible interpretation. § 1.56(b).
40. § 1.56(b)(2).
41. 57 Fed. Reg. 2023 (1992).
42. 57 Fed. Reg. 2023.
43. 56 Fed. Reg. 37,324 (1991) (proposed Aug. 6, 1991).
44. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a); see Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1457
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
45. Three conditions must be met to cure inequitable conduct during prosecution. First, the
applicant must expressly advise the PTO of the existence of a prior misrepresentation, stating
specifically where it resides. Second, the applicant must advise the PTO of the actual facts, if the
prior misrepresentation was factual, and must indicate that further examination may be required.
Finally, the applicant must establish the patentability of the claimed subject matter. Robin & Haas
Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984);
see also 5 Chisum, supra note 7, § 19.03[6][a], at 19-249 to 19-251.
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substantively involved in the preparation and prosecution of a patent
application, including the inventor, the patent attorney, and any
employees of the inventor or attorney.46 Inventors and attorneys can
discharge their duty only through disclosure directly to the PTO;
employees of the inventor or attorney may discharge their duty by
disclosure to their employer.47 Disclosures must be in writing,4'and are
usually accomplished through an information disclosure statement.49
2. Purpose and Policy of the Duty of Candor
The duty of candor is a judicially-created doctrine originating in
efforts by the courts to prevent fraudulent patent procurement.
Fraudulent procurement always has been recognized as improper," and
as grounds for invalidating a patent. Initially, invalidation required a
showing that the patentee or the patentee's agents committed common-
law fraud upon the PTO. Common-law fraud requires, among other
things, intent and misrepresentation by the patentee, and reliance upon
the misrepresentation by the PTO.5 In a series of decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court reduced the showing necessary for unenforceability of a
patent by recognizing "inequitable conduct" as a defense to patent
infringement under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.5 2 In reducing
46. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (1995).
47. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a), (d) (1995).
48. 37 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1995); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure § 2002.02 (6th ed. rev. 1996).
49. An information disclosure statement must include: (1) a list of all patents, publications, and
other information submitted for consideration by the PTO; (2) legible copies of each U.S. and
foreign patent, including a translation of any non-English document; and (3) an explanation of the
relevance of each reference that is not in the English language. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (1995); see also 3
Chisum, supra note 7, § 11.03[4][c][ii], at 11-200 to 11-203.
50. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (amended 1793) (providing for
private suits to invalidate fraudulently obtained patents).
51. Common law fraud requires a showing of seven elements: (1) a representation; (2) of a
material fact; (3) the falsity of such representation; (4) scienter or intent to deceive, coupled with
knowledge of falsity; (5) reasonable reliance by the party to whom the representation is made; (6)
deception of the relying party by virtue of their reliance; and (7) injury to the relying party resulting
from their reliance. See 2 Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 15.08[1][a], at 15-180 to
15-181 (2d ed. 1996).
52. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator
Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933). Under the doctrine of unclean hands, a court of equity may deny relief to a
party whose conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and deceitful, but the doctrine applies only when
the reprehensible conduct pertains to the controversy at issue. Black's Law Dictionary 1524 (6th ed.
1043
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the standard to inequitable conduct,53 the Court articulated a duty of
candor, breach of which would be considered inequitable conduct. 4
To keep abreast of this developing judicial doctrine, the PTO enacted
Rule 56, its provision dealing with fraudulent procuremenL. Initially, the
provision did not expressly deal with the duty of candor, but courts
interpreting the rule soon held that "fraud" under Rule 56 included
breach of this duty." In 1977, the PTO amended Rule 56 to include an
express duty of candor.5 6 Subsequent court decisions differed on the
meaning of the new PTO rule: some saw it merely as a codification of
the existing PTO standard of conduct,57 while others saw it as a vast
expansion of the judicial doctrines." Under the amended Rule 56, there
was a proliferation of inequitable conduct charges in patent litigation and
a variety of interpretations of the elements of the duty of candor.59 In
1992, the PTO amended Rule 56 to clarify certain elements of the duty.'
The duty of candor as a means of preventing fraudulent procurement
usually is justified on three grounds. First, a patent affects an important
public interest6e ' because of the limited monopoly which it confers.62
Because of a patent's potential economic impact it is necessary, insofar
as possible, to assure that the patent system functions properly and free
of fraud; this will happen only if the PTO considers all material
1990). In the patent context, the doctrine of unclean hands means that a party who obtained a patent
through inequitable conduct is not entitled to its enforcement.
53. Inequitable conduct is used when all the elements of common law fraud are not present. See
Rosenberg, supra note 51, § 15.08[l][aJ, at 15-180.
54. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 818 (stating that patent practitioners have "an
uncompromising duty to report to [the patent office] all facts concerning possible fraud or
inequitableness underlying the applications in issue").
55. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.:.A. 1970).
56. 42 Fed. Reg. 5593 (Jan. 28, 1977).
57. See, e.g., In re Jembek, 789 F.2d 886, 890 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[l']he present PTO
standard ... codifies the PTO policy on fraud and inequitable conduct .. "); see also 3 Chisum,
supra note 7, § 11.03[4][b][ii], at 11-163.
58. See, e.g., In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The PTO mischaracterizes [Rule
56] as a 'codification'-a word of very elastic meaning-the fact being that it has inaugurated a
whole new way of life in the prosecution of patent applications.").
59. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayca Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("ITihe habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague.").
60. 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (1992).
61. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 815 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).
62. A patent gives the inventor the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the inve:ntion in the United
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information before granting a patent.63 Second, patent examination is
considered an ex parte proceeding, so that the adversarial process cannot
be relied upon to force the parties to develop the full facts of the case.'
There is no incentive for the applicant to disclose unfavorable
information, and in some cases-such as the "on sale" and "in use"
statutory bars6 -the applicant may be the sole source of relevant
information. Unlike an adversarial proceeding, the examiner cannot
compel production of evidence by the applicant, so the duty to disclose is
placed squarely upon the applicant and the applicant's agents to provide
the incentive to reveal unfavorable information. The final justification for
the duty of candor is more pragmatic. The PTO, faced with an increasing
volume of applications, relies upon the applicant to provide it with
material to be used for consideration of the patent and to relieve it of the
duty of conducting extensive prior art searches.' The duty of candor thus
helps the PTO conduct an efficient operation.
3. Enforcement of the Duty of Candor
Enforcement of the duty of candor takes place primarily in the federal
courts during patent litigation, although there is limited enforcement at
the PTO. In the federal courts, a breach of the duty of candor is punished
through a finding of inequitable conduct. Charges of inequitable conduct
usually arise when an accused patent infringer asserts as a defense that
the patent is unenforceable because of inequitable conduct in its
procurement.67 Once placed in issue, inequitable conduct is determined
using a two-part test. First, both the materiality of the information
withheld and the intent of the patentee or the patentee's agent in
withholding it must exceed threshold levels.68 The thresholds presumably
ensure that, if there is no intent or materiality, or if both are minimal, the
court's time is not wasted on a de minimis issue. Second, if threshold
levels are met, the court performs a balancing test between materiality
63. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
64. Courts, however, have recognized that prosecution is not fully ex-parte. It is instead more of a
hybrid proceeding having elements ofex parte and adversarial proceedings. See infra note 164.
65. For a discussion of the statutory bars, see supra part I.A.1.
66. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1970).
67. See discussion supra part I.B.
68. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 822 (1985). The threshold degree of materiality may be established using the PTO's
materiality test. The threshold degree of intent is established either by direct evidence, or by indirect
evidence such as showing acts the natural consequences of which are presumably intended by the
actor. Id.
1045
Washington Law Review Vol. 71:1035, 1996
and intent to decide if inequitable conduct has occurred. 9 A finding of
inequitable conduct can lead to severe penalties for the patentee and the
attorney. For the patentee, the penalty is outright unenforceability of the
entire patent.7" If the breach is particularly egregious, the case may
qualify as exceptional and result in an award of attorney's fees to the
accused infringer.7' For the attorney, committing inequitable conduct can
result in disciplinary action by the F'TO. 72
PTO enforcement of the duty of candor is primarily restricted to
disciplinary action against practitioners. Breach of the duty of candor is a
violation of the PTO Code of Professional Responsibility7' and may
result in sanctions74 such as suspension' or disbarment.7 1 Although Rule
56 states that the PTO will not issue patents found to be tainted by
fraud,77 the PTO no longer enforces the duty of candor by striking or
rejecting patent applications 7 because the courts are seen as a better
forum for determining the necessary element of intenl.79 The PTO,
however, reserves the right under its inherent powers to strike or reject
applications in cases where violations are particularly egregious."0
69. An intent to deceive and materiality are inverse elements in that a greater showing of one
requires a lesser showing of the other. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
70. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989); J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559. See generally 5 Chisum, supra
note 7, § 19.03[6][b]. The patent is not invalidated; it is merely held unenforceable, although the
distinction between the two is truly minimal. Id. at 19-252.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
72. See 5 Chisum, supra note 7, § 19.03[16]j], at 19-281.
73. 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(c)(10) (1995).
74. See, e.g., Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[Wlhere a
person entitled to practice before the PTO has breached that duty of candor ... it may well be
appropriate or necessary to issue sanctions directly against that attorney .... ").
75. See, e.g., Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949) (affirming disbannent of practitioner
found to have breached duty of candor); Klein v. Peterson, 866 F.2d 412, 417 (Fed. Cir.) (affirming
two year suspension and five year probation for practitioner who violated duty of candor), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989).
76. See generally Steven E. Lipman, Prosecution of Practitioners for Violation of the PTO Code
of Professional Responsibility: Facing the Reali'ies of Losing Your License, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 119
(1986); Cameron Weiffenbach, Attorney Conduct and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Off ce, 14
AIPLA Q.J. 73 (1986).
77. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
78. 56 Fed. Reg. 37,323 (1991) (proposed Aug. 6, 1991).
79. See 3 Chisum, supra note 7, § 11.03[4][b][i-v], at 11-177 to 11-178.
80. 56 Fed. Reg. 37,323.
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II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
PATENT PROSECUTION
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Confidentiality and Attorney-Client Privilege
Confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege are different concepts.
Confidentiality is a broad rule of professional conduct that prevents
disclosure of any information related to the representation of the client.8'
Although confidentiality serves as the underlying premise of the
attorney-client privilege,82 the privilege is a much narrower evidentiary
rule83 that protects only against compelled disclosure of communications
between attorney and client. Thus, the privilege may be viewed as a tool
for maintaining confidentiality, and failure by the attorney to properly
and timely assert the privilege where applicable will violate the duty of
confidentiality.'
The narrow scope of attorney-client privilege compared to
confidentiality is a crucial limitation. The privilege applies only to the
communication between lawyer and client, not to the underlying
information contained in the communication.85 Thus, the privilege does
not prevent disclosure of information that is independently discoverable
just because the same information was communicated to a lawyer. For
the attorney, the distinction between the communication and the
information makes it important to know the source of the client's
information. If the underlying information is common knowledge or
knowledge in the public domain, it may be disclosed if disclosure can be
accomplished without revealing that the client is a source of the
information, and without revealing the communication itself.8 6 But if the
information is private and the client is the sole source of the information,
then the communication is the information and neither may be disclosed.
81. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1995); PTO Code of Professional
Responsibility, 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.56-.57 (1995). It is unclear whether, during PTO practice, the
attorney is subject to both sets of rules of conduct, or whether the PTO rules fully or partially
preempt a state bar's conduct rules. See Paul L Herman, Note, Can Thou Serve Two Masters?-The
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct v. The Patent and Trademark Office Code of
Professional Responsibility, 2 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. 31 (1993).
82. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 5.
83. Fed. R. Evid. 501; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
84. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 20.
85. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 5:1, at 288 (1993).
86. Id. § 5:1, at 300-01.
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A contrived example illustrates the principle. Suppose the client sends a
letter to the attorney in the course of representation stating that (1) the
White House is in Washington, D.C., and (2) the client has a secret Swiss
bank account. If asked, the lawyer cannot refuse to say where the White
House is because that is common knowledge. But if asked about Swiss
bank accounts, the lawyer can refuse to disclose the client's secret
account because the client's communication is the sole source of the
lawyer's information, and thus the communication is the information.
This example presumes that all other conditions for the application of
attorney-client privilege are met. These conditions include! the existence
of an actual or prospective attorney-client relationship, the establishment
and maintenance of confidentiality, and the lack of waiver of the
privilege by the client. Each of these conditions is discussed below.
2. The Law ofAttorney-Client Privilege
The basic requirements for protection under the privilege were defined
by Professor Wigmore87 and elaborated upon by Judge Wyzanski."
Under the Wyzanski test,89 attorney-client privilege requires the party
asserting privilege to show that:
1. The asserted holder of the privilege is, or sought to become, a
client.
2. The person to whom the communication was made:
(a) is a member of the bar of a court or his subordinate; and
(b) in connection with the communication is acting as a lawyer.
3. The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed:
(a) by the client; and
(b) without the presence of strangers.
4. For the primary purpose of securing either:
(a) legal services; or
(b) assistance in some legal proceeding; but not
(c) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort.
87. 8 John H. Wigmore & John T. McNaughton, Wigmore on Evidence § 2292, at 554 (6th rev.
ed. 1961).
88. United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). Although
worded slightly differently, both the Wigmore anl Wyzanski tests encompass the same elements.
See Gregg F. LoCascio, Reassessing Attorney-Client Privileged Legal Advice in Patent Litigation,
69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1203, 1230 (1994) (providing exhaustive linguistic analysi; of both rules).
89. United States Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
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5. The privilege has been:
(a) claimed; and
(b) not waived by the client.
Although the test contains five elements, it comprises only three
concepts. The first, second, and fourth elements together refer to the
attorney-client relationship and the duration of the privilege. The third
element encompasses a confidentiality requirement. The fifth element is
a requirement that the privilege not be waived.
The second and fourth elements refer to the existence and nature of
the attorney-client relationship. At least one of the parties must be a
practicing attorney and must be acting as such in connection with the
particular communication, and the purpose of the relationship must be
the rendering of legal services. The fourth element also contains one of
the most important exceptions to the privilege-that legal advice not be
sought from the lawyer for the purpose of committing a crime, fraud, or
tort. The first element refers to the duration of the privilege, which
differs from the duration of the attorney-client relationship. The privilege
applies before formation of the attorney-client relationship: initial
interviews between lawyer and client are covered by the privilege, even
if the interview never leads to formal representation or other engagement
of the lawyer's services.90 If a relationship is formed, the privilege covers
all communications made during the relationship, and as to such
communications survives termination of that relationship and even the
client's death. However, communications made after the end of the
relationship are not privileged.9
The confidentiality requirement contained in the third element of the
Wyzanski test has three parts.92 First, the client must have intended the
communication with the attorney to be confidential. Second, the client's
subjective expectation of confidentiality must have been reasonable
under the circumstances. Third, confidentiality must have been
subsequently maintained. The objective dimension-that the expectation
of confidentiality be reasonable-usually negates the privilege where the
90. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 663 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The existence
of the privilege cannot be limited to instances in which the attorney-client relationship comes to full
fruition .... If that were required, a person would be compelled to retain the first attorney consulted
in order to preserve the privilege."), vacated and rev'd on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1982); see also Rice, supra note 85, § 2:4, at 57-58.
91. See Rice, supra note 85, § 2:4, at 66-67.
92. Id. § 6:1, at 383-84.
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communication is intended to be relayed to a party outside the attorney-
client relationship.'
The fifth element of the test covers waiver of the privilege. The
attorney-client privilege may be waived by the client, who is the holder
of the privilege. Waiver may be express, or it may be implied by words
or conduct inconsistent with maintaining the privilege.94 In addition,
neither lawyer nor client can selectively disclose confidential parts of a
privileged communication: 95 waiver through disclosure of part of the
communication represents a waiver as to the whole co:mmunication. 9'
Courts determine the level of disclosure that triggers a waiver utilizing a
standard of fairness that takes into account the amount and nature of the
material disclosed, the context of the disclosure (for example, whether it
was judicially compelled over objection), and the gain realized by the
privilege holder through the selective disclosure.97
Once attorney-client privilege applies to a communication, its
protection is absolute; no showing of need, good cause, or unavailability
of the evidence-no matter how severely they affect the requester-will
defeat the privilege. But despite its absolute protection, there are several
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.9" The most important of these
for the purposes of this Comment is the crime/fraud/:ort exception,
discussed below.
3. The Crime/Fraud/Tort Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege
As with most legal rules, there are exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege that prevent its application even if all its conditions are met.
The most important exception is the crime/fraud/tort exception,
contained in element 4(c) of the Wyzanski test. This exception aims to
prevent abuse of the attorney-client relationship by the cl:ient. If a client
consults an attorney with the intent or purpose of committing a wrong,
93. Id. § 6:9, at 424-25.
94. For example, disclosure of privileged material to third parties who ara not agents of the
attorney or client, an act forbidden by element 3(b) of the Wyzanski test, will waive the privilege. Id.
§ 9:27, at 9-55 to 9-56.
95. Id. § 9:28, at 9-64.
96. Id. § 9:28, at 9-66.
97. Id. § 9:28, at 9-66 to 9-70.
98. There are four exceptions: (1) joint client representation, where parties jointly retain the
services of an attorney as their common agent on a matter of common interest; (2) actions by
individuals to whom a fiduciary duty is owed; (3) contested wills; and (4) cases where legal advice is
sought for the purpose of committing a crime, fr-.ud, or tort. Id. ch. 8. Exception!; to the privilege are
not granted for "unavailability," "good cause," or "necessity." Id.
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then the privilege will not apply. To defeat the privilege under this
exception, the party seeking to invoke the exception must make a prima
facie showing of four factors: that the client was engaged in wrongful
conduct when the attorney was consulted; that the client was planning
such conduct when the advice was sought; that the attorney's assistance
either furthered a criminal, fraudulent, or tortious activity or was closely
related to such activity; and that there is a connection between the
alleged wrongs and the consultation with the attorney.' There is no need
to show that the attorney was aware of the client's endeavors or
participated in them."°
Application of the crime/fraud/tort exception focuses on the intent of
the client, because the client is the holder of the privilege and the
exception is meant to prevent abuse of the attorney-client relationship by
the client. A lawyer's culpable intent, however, can sometimes be
imputed to the client. If the lawyer's intent is demonstrated, it raises a
reasonable suspicion that the client either solicited that type of advice or
was aware of the advice's character, and is sufficient to justify an in-
camera inspection of the communication sought to be protected.' O' If the
communication and other evidence submitted to the judge demonstrate
that the client was a conscious participant in the illegal enterprise, then
the crime/fraud/tort exception will apply and the communication must be
revealed to whoever seeks to compel its disclosure. °2
4. Policy of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is a recognized evidentiary and discovery
rule with common law origins. 3 The privilege is a policy exception to
the rule that the courts and public are entitled to each person's
evidence,"°  arrived at by subjugating the court's evidentiary
requirements to the public's need for freedom of consultation with
lawyers. The privilege is thought to increase the effectiveness of the legal
99. Id. § 8:3.
100. Id. § 8:4.
101. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989) ("Disclosure of allegedly privileged
materials to the district court for purposes of determining the merits of a claim of privilege does not
have the legal effect of terminating the privilege."). See generally Rice, supra note 85, § 8:4. During
an in-camera ("in chambers") inspection, the judge reviews communications alleged to be protected
by attomey-client privilege to determine whether application of the exception is justified.
102. See Rice, supra note 85, § 8:4, at 575.
103. Id. § 2:1, at46 n.1.
104. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323,331 (1950); Rice, supra note 85, § 2:3, at 51.
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people to seek legal advice freely. By protecting communications
designed to obtain legal advice, clients will be more candid in revealing
the situation upon which they seek advice. The lawyer will thus have
complete facts and can render complete and effective legal advice and
assistance so that clients will understand their obligations and
responsibilities under the law.0 5
Critics of the privilege point out that it obstructs justice,"6 but it is
unclear how the privilege obstructs the truth, because it only conceals
information that might never have come to light but for the privilege.0 7
The long-term social benefits of the privilege are thought to outweigh the
immediate cost of "lost evidence."'0' Because the benefits of the
attorney-client privilege are speculative, the privilege always is
construed as narrowly as possible consistent with its purpose to avoid
giving away any more evidence than necessary."
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege in Patent Prosecution
Application of attorney-client privilege in a simultaneous
representation case does not seem to have been considered by the courts.
In the context of single client representation, courts have focused upon
whether the privilege covers information revealed to the lawyer which
was immaterial to the patent and was not disclosed to the PTO. Material
information would not be protected by privilege because the client would
know that material information would have to be forwarded to the PTO
and the client thus had no expectation of confidentiality, either subjective
or objective." 0
The courts' application of the privilege to communications that occur
during patent prosecution has produced an inconsistent bo dy of case law.
These inconsistencies originate from three sources: misconceptions about
the work of the patent attorney, rnsinterpretation of the duty of candor,
105. See Rice, supra note 85, § 2:3.
106. Id. § 2:3, at 56 n.38.
107. Id. § 2:3, at 56-57.
108. Id. § 2:3, at 54.
109. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, "110 (1974) ("[E]xceptions to tle demand for every
man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the
search for the truth."); see also Rice, supra note 85, § 2:3, at 55-56; Wigrrore, supra note 87,
§ 2291, at 554 ("[The] benefits [of the privilege] are all indirect and speculative [and] its obstruction
is plain and concrete .... [The privilege] ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle.").
110. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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and misunderstanding of the attorney-client privilege. In early cases,
patent attorneys were denied the privilege because they were not
considered to be engaged in the practice of law... and therefore did not
qualify for the privilege because they did not meet elements 2(b) and 4(a)
of the Wyzanski test."2 Instead, they were seen as mere scriveners
performing a ministerial function in transmitting the client's technical
information to the PTO for examination. The U.S. Supreme Court struck
down this line of reasoning, but only held that patent attorneys practice
law."' The Court did not address whether preparation of patent
applications constitutes the practice of law, but most courts have applied
the Court's holding to this aspect of patent practice."'
Having recognized that patent attorneys practice law, the courts seized
upon the "conduit theory" to deny the privilege to patent attorneys." 5
The seminal case in conduit theory is Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co."'
Jack Winter interpreted the duty of candor as all-encompassing: all
information conveyed to the patent attorney-whether material or not-
was to be disclosed to the PTO." 7 This broad reading of the duty of
candor meant that, under the third element of the Wyzanski test,"' the
client never had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality and thus the
privilege did not attach. In the court's opinion, the patent attorney had no
discretion in selecting information to be disclosed to the PTO; the
attorney was merely a conduit by which all inventor information was
transferred to the PTO." 9 Many courts continue to apply conduit theory
to patent attorneys.
20
Ill. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463
(S.D.N.Y 1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
112. Element 2(b) requires that the person to whom the client communicates be acting as a lawyer
in connection with the communication. Element 4(a) requires that the communication be for the
primary purpose of securing legal services. See supra part II.A.2.
113. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1949) ("We do not question the determination
that... the preparation and prosecution of patent applications for others constitutes the practice of
law.").
114. Rice, supra note 85, § 7:23, at 547.
115. Conduit theory gets its name from the fact that it treats the patent attorney as merely an
information conduit between the inventor and the PTO.
116. 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
117. Id.
118. The third element of the Wyzanski test requires that clients have a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality in their communication with the lawyer. See supra part I.A.2.
119. Jack Winter, 50 F.R.D. at 228-29.
120. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (ordering disclosure of draft applications), affid, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2136 (1994); Quantum Corp. v. Western Digital Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
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A later opinion addressing the issue of privilege in patent prosecution,
Knogo Corp. v. United States,'2' deemed the Jack Winter logic unsound
on two grounds. First, Knogo found that Jack Winter relied on
misconceptions about the role of the patent attorney in prosecution:
A distinction can be made between the duty to disc:[ose how to
make and use the invention and the mere funneling of technical
information from the client through the attorney to the Patent
Office. The former is the job of the patent attorney, while the latter
is an inaccurate, and uninformed characterization of the patent
attorney's role in the preparation and prosecution of a patent
application.122
Second, Knogo found that Jack Winter's overly broad reading of the
duty of candor was inappropriate. The court noted that the duty of candor
is not absolute and only requires disclosure of information that is
material to a patent application."2 The Knogo court thus concluded that
application of attorney-client privilege to information immaterial to
prosecution was appropriate. Like Jack Winter, Knogo also has many
adherents in the case law.1
24
A final ground for denying the privilege to patent attorneys is
presented in American Standard v. Pfizer." The American Standard
(BNA) 1062 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (ordering production of draft applications and transmittal letters);
Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 7 U.S-P.Q.2d (BNA) 1511 (E.D. Fa. 1988) (ordering
production of draft applications and cover letters); Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.RtD. 1, 10
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (ordering production of patent disclosures, draft applications, purely technical
information, and prior art studies); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del.
1977) (ordering production of purely technical information).
121. 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
122. Id. at940.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Rohn & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 815 F. Supp. 793, "96 (D. Del. 1993)
(extending protection to draft patent applications and associated notes), aft'd, 19 F.3d 41 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Ball Corp. v. American Nat'l Can Co., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1958, 1959 (S.D. Ind. 1993)
("[T]he duty of candor to the PTO... should no' override the attorney client privilege."); Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys. Inc. v. C.R Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372, 378 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that
communications between inventor and attorney are presumptively protected, oven if they consist
entirely of technical information); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Ampad Corp., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1589, 1590-91 (D. Mass. 1987) (extending protection to inventor's memorandum describing
invention); Synair Corp. v. American Indus. Tire, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
('[Material information falls outside the attorney/client privilege."); FMC Corp. v. Old Dominion
Brush Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 150, 152 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (protecting inventor's memorandum on
prior art).
125. 828 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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court allowed discovery of an attorney opinion letter'26 because it
contained an analysis of publicly available prior art. The court reasoned
that the document was not protected by the privilege because it contained
publicly available information.'27 American Standard has been criticized
severely for misunderstanding the attorney-client privilege.'28 The
misunderstanding stems from the court's focus on the information rather
than the communication. Although the underlying information was
public and thus not protected by the privilege, the communication
itself-the attorney's opinion letter-was protected and should not have
been disclosed.'29
III. RESOLVING THE PRIVILEGE/CANDOR CONFLICT IN
SIMULTANEOUS PATENT REPRESENTATION
A. The Federal Circuit's Role in Deciding Privilege Issues
The inconsistent application of attorney-client privilege in patent
prosecution130 has been perpetuated because of the unique jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit exercises specific, nationwide
subject matter jurisdiction, unlike other federal appellate courts whose
jurisdiction is predicated on geographic locale. The Federal Circuit
exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all matters arising under,
or related to, the substantive patent laws,' 3' and has a mandate to achieve
uniformity in patent matters. 32
During patent trials, federal district courts are bound by the
substantive patent law of the Federal Circuit33 but are free to follow the
procedural rules of their regional circuit. This application of substantive
126. Patent attorneys are often called upon to state their opinion on whether a client's patent is
valid or whether a client's product infringes on another party's patent. The attorney opinion letter is
the vehicle for communicating the lawyer's opinion to the client.
127. American Standard, 828 F.2d at 745-46.
128. Id at 747 (Newman, J., dissenting); Rice, supra note 85, § 9:29, at 9-74 to 9-76; Daniel A.
DeVito & Michael P. Dierks, Exploring Anew the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product
Doctrine in Patent Litigation: The Pendulum Swings Again, This Time in Favor of Protection, 22
AIPLA Q.J. 103, 131 (1994); LoCascio, supra note 88, at 1241-44.
129. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 390 (D.D.C. 1978) ("If an attorney-
client communication could be discovered if it contained information known to others, then it would
be the rare communication that would be protected and, in turn, it would be the rare client who
would freely communicate to an attorney."); see also discussion supra part II.A.2.
130. See discussion supra part II.B.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (1994); see also supra note I and accompanying text.
132. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
133. Id. at 1573.
1055
Washington Law Review
and procedural rules from different circuits happens because, as a matter
of policy, the Federal Circuit reviews procedural matters that are not
unique to patent issues under the law of the circuit in which the patent
litigation takes place.' This policy avoids putting the district courts in a
position where they are bound by the procedural law of more than one
court of appeals and avoids problems related to stare decisis and
certainty of law.135 The Jack Winer-Knogo split in the application of
attorney-client privilege during patent prosecution has pe: sisted because
the Federal Circuit considers matters of privilege in the d:strict courts to
be a procedural issue not unique to patents. Unfortunately, the Federal
Circuit has not articulated a standard for deciding when procedural
matters are unique enough to patent issues to merit a ruling.
In Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 36  patent attorney Smith
simultaneously represented two clients, Molins and Lemel:3on. Defendant
Textron accused Molins of inequitable conduct because Smith failed to
disclose Lemelson's application, which was allegedly material to Molins'
patent application. 37 Smith argued that the Lemelson information was
cumulative to that already in the record, and thus was not material' 38 The
Federal Circuit agreed with Smith and resolved the charge of inequitable
conduct on this ground.
139
Issues of conflict of interest and attorney-client privilege were not
directly addressed by the court because these issues were: not argued; a
conflict of interest was not alleged against Smith, and Smith did not
assert attorney-client privilege to defend his failure to disclose the
Lemelson information. But in dicta, the Molins court split three ways
about the conflicting obligations placed upon patent attorneys by the
PTO's duty of candor and the rules of professional responsibility. Judge
Lourie, writing for the majority, hinted that he thought Smith's behavior
was improper, 4 ' but abstained from expressing a formal opinion on the
privilege and conflict issues, because neither was properly before the
134. Id. at 1574-75.
135. Id. at 1574; see also 1B James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 0.402[1] (1996)
(discussing application of stare decisis in regional federal courts and in specialized federal courts
like U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit).
136. 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
137. Id. at 1177.
138. Id. at 1185.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1185 ("[D]ual representation of two clients seeking patents in closely related
technologies created a risk of sacrificing the interest of one client for that of the other and of failing
to discharge his duty of candor to the PTO with respect to each client.").
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court."' Judge Nies argued that Smith faced a clear conflict of interest by
representing both clients and should have withdrawn from representing
Molins. 42 Moreover, Judge Nies hinted that she thought attorney-client
privilege would not override the duty of candor. Finally, Judge Newman
argued that Smith had no obligation to disclose the Lemelson application
to the PTO because this information was protected by the absolute
barrier of attorney-client privilege.'43 Judge Newman did not address the
conflict of interest issue.
The two issues suggested by the Molins court's split dicta--conflict of
interest" and application of attorney-client privilege-seem to be issues
of first impression. As to attorney-client privilege, the precise issue is
whether, when a patent attorney simultaneously represents two clients
seeking patents in closely related technical fields, the attorney can use
the attorney-client privilege to avoid disclosure of confidential
information received from one client when that information is material to
the other client and must be thus be disclosed pursuant to the PTO's duty
of candor. This issue is a matter unique to patent law, which the Federal
Circuit can and should address, under both its authority and its mandate
to achieve uniformity in patent law. The issue requires an interpretation
of the duty of candor, a regulation passed pursuant to the PTO's
statutorily granted authority,14 and thus a matter of substantive patent
law subject to judicial review by the Federal Circuit. Also, it is not an
issue of procedure in the federal courts, but rather a question unique to
PTO procedure, making it similar to other issues the Federal Circuit
regularly decides.'46
141. Id. at 1185 ("Whether or not there was a conflict of interest, however, is not before us, and
we express no opinion thereon. Nor do we express any opinion regarding the apparent conflict
between an attorney's obligations to the PTO and the attorney's obligation to clients.").
142. Id. at 1190 (Nies, J., dissenting in part) ("Smith's representation of clients with conflicting
interests provides no justification for deceiving the PTO.").
143. Id. at 1192 (Newman, L, dissenting in part) ("[Smith's] obligation to preserve the
confidentiality of his client Lemelson was absolute.").
144. Conflict of interest issues are beyond the scope of this Comment, but potential conflict of
interest situations will be pointed out as they arise.
145. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1994).
146. See, e.g., Dennis M. de Guzman, Note, In re Epstein: A Case of Patent Hearsay, 70 Wash. L.
Rev. 805 (1995) (discussing In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1994), Federal Circuit decision
holding hearsay evidence admissible during patent prosecution).
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B. Hypothetical Scenario for Discussion
Discussion of the application of privilege when one attorney
simultaneously represents two patent-seeking clients is based on the
following hypothetical scenario, which is an abstraction of the relevant
facts in Molins.
One patent attorney, L, simultaneously prosecutes the patents of two
clients, C1 and C2, both of whom have invented products in the same or
closely related technical fields. 47 During L's prosecution of both patents,
C2 communicates certain information to L. L recognizes the potential
materiality of the information to both Cl and C2's patents, but does not
disclose C2's revelation to the PTO. Some time after Cl's patent issues,
a third party seeks to render Cl's patent unenforceable on grounds of
inequitable conduct. The third party accuses L of breaching the duty of
candor by failing to disclose C2's information in connection with Cl's
patent.
C. Possible Defenses for Failure ro Disclose
The possible effects of C2's information on Cl's and C2's patents are
illustrated in table 1:148 C2's communication to L may be material to C2's
patent, Cl's patent, both, or neither. To counter the charges of
inequitable conduct, L can asset two defenses: 4 9 (1) that C2's
information was immaterial to Cl's patent and thus outside the duty of
candor, or (2) that L could not reveal C2's information in connection
with Cl's patent because the information is within C2's attorney-client
privilege. L's choice of defense would depend on where C2's
information falls in table 1.
147. The rules of professional conduct prevent simultaneous representation of clients whose
interests are directly adverse. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a) (1995). This
Comment assumes that, at least initially, the interests of Cl are not directly adverse to the interests of
C2.
148. The definitions of "material" and "not material" in table 1 follow the definitions found in the
duty of candor: "material" means that the information is at least prima facie unfavorable to the patent
application and not cumulative to that already in the record, whereas "not matenal" means that the
information is either favorable, neutral (that is, irrelevant), or cumulative to information already in
the record. See discussion supra part I.C.1.
149. Other defenses are available, but they render the privilege issue moot and will not be
discussed here. For example, L could argue that the failure to disclose was not intentional, or that L
didn't recognize the materiality of C2's information to Cl's patent. See discussion supra part I.C. 1.
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Table 1:
Possible Effects of C2's Information on C2's and Cl's Patents












Quadrant I, where C2's information is material to both C1 and C2's
patents, leaves L with no defense. Attorney-client privilege does not
apply because C2's information must be disclosed to the PTO and C2
therefore had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality.15 Because no
privilege applies, the information also must be disclosed in connection
with Cl's patent. In quadrant III, C2's attorney-client privilege also does
not apply, but the point is moot because the information is immaterial to
C1 and need not be disclosed. Quadrant IV does not put C2's attorney-
client privilege in issue' because C2's information is immaterial to both
150. C2 did not have a subjective expectation of confidentiality at the time of disclosure. Even if
C2 did have an expectation of confidentiality, it was unreasonable because C2 knew at the time of
disclosure to the attorney that any material information would have to be revealed to the PTO. See
discussion supra part I.A.2.
151. There is a potential conflict of interest here. The rules prohibit representation of one client
where the attorney's options will be limited by the representation of another client Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1995). Consider the quadrant IV case where C2's information is
favorable, and thus immaterial, to Cl's patent If L could use C2's information to rebut other
information unfavorable to Cl, then L's options in representing Cl would be limited by the
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client's patents. The information is therefore outside L's duty of candor
as to both C1 and C2, and L is not required to disclose it against either
client.'52 By deciding that the information in question was cumulative
and thus immaterial, the Molins court placed the information in quadrant
111.153
Quadrant II presents the more interesting situation. Here, L need not
disclose the information against C2 because it is immaterial to C2's
patent. But L knows that the information exists and is material to Cl's
patent and should therefore disclose it. L thus faces a dilemma: if the
information is not disclosed against C1 the duty of candor will be
breached as to C1, but if the information is disclosed-presuming that
disclosure could be avoided through an assertion of privilege-the duty
of confidentiality is violated with respect to C2. It is thus important to
know whether privilege will attach in this situation.
The remaining discussion focuses on the ramifications of the quadrant
II situation and argues that, under existing law and for policy reasons, the
privilege should apply and defeat the duty of candor.
D. Legal Analysis of the Privilege Issue
Before arguing that attorney-client privilege should be recognized as a
defense in the quadrant II situation, three things must be established.
First, C2's information must fall within the bounds of L's duty of candor;
if it does not, the question of privilege is moot. Second, C2's information
must fall within the attorney-client privilege; again, if privilege does not
apply the question is moot. Finally, the information must not be within
the crime/fraud/tort exception to the privilege.
1. The Quadrant II Case Falls Within the Duty of Candor
Under the circumstances of the above hypothetical situation, the
information C2 communicated to L is subject to disclosure against C1
under the duty of candor. All the elements of the duty of candor are
representation of C2 because attorney-client privilege would prevent the use of C22's information on
Cl's behalf.
152. There is no duty to disclose information that is favorable (that is, not material) to a patent. 37
C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1995); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 48, § 2001.04.
153. In Molins, the attorney failed to disclose ie patent application of the second client against
the patent application of the first. Because the information was the patent application itself, it was
presumably material to the second client's patent. But the court decided that it was immaterial to the
first client's application, thus placing the information in quadrant Mll. Molins PLC! v. Textron, Inc.,
48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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present: L, as Cl's representative before the PTO, is subject to the duty;
L knew that the information existed, and knew of its materiality to Cl's
patent; and L knew of the information during the time he was prosecuting
Cl's patent. All these elements place the information squarely within the
duty of candor.
2. The Quadrant HI Case Falls Within the Privilege.
Under the conditions of our scenario, most elements of the Wyzanski
test'54 are easily met. There is no question that C2 is L's client, that the
communication was made to L while acting as C2's lawyer, and that the
primary purpose of the communication was to secure legal services and
advice in connection with C2's patent. Therefore, the application of
privilege turns on the third element of the Wyzanski test and involves
C2's reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the disclosure to L.
Whether C2's expectation of privacy was reasonable depends on two
factors: the source of C2's information and the interpretation of the duty
of candor.
If C2's information is publicly available, then C2 could have no
reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the underlying information
and L would have to disclose. This is not to say that the attorney-client
privilege does not apply to C2's communication with L. The privilege
applies, but it protects only the communication between C2 and L, not
the underlying information. 5 For example, suppose C2 wrote a letter to
L in which C2 disclosed several publicly available prior art references,
one of which is material to Cl's patent. L cannot disclose C2's letter,
because it is a communication protected by the privilege. L may,
however, disclose the prior art reference that is material to Cl's patent.
If, on the other hand, C2's information was private information that was
not publicly available, C2 definitely would have a reasonable expectation
of confidentiality in the information. L could not then disclose C2's
information, because it would be a confidential part of the
communication. Because C2's communication was not public
knowledge, then the logic of American Standard would not apply, even
if it were found to be correct.156
154. The Wyzanski test sets forth the five elements that must be present before a communication
will be protected by the attorney-client privilege. See discussion supra part ll.A.2.
155. See discussion supra part II.A.I.
156. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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In the case where C2's information was not publicly known, C2's
reasonable expectation of privacy would depend on how broadly the duty
of candor is interpreted. This depends on whether the Federal Circuit
subscribes to the Jack Winter"7 line of cases or the Krogo5 8 line of
cases. The logic of the Jack Winter line of cases would hold C2's
communication outside the privilege; with its all-encompassing
interpretation of the duty of candor,'59 C2 would have had no reasonable
expectation of confidentiality since all information wouAld have to be
passed on to the PTO. The Knogo line of cases reads the duty of candor
more narrowly, and therefore recognizes that attorney-client privilege
will trump candor where information is immaterial to patentability."6
Under Knogo, C2 would be covered by the privilege because the
information is immaterial to C2's patent and C2 would therefore have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Jack Winter rests on misconceptions of the patent attorney's role and
the duty of candor, and ignores analogous situations in which the
attorney-client privilege is recognized. It should not be followed by the
Federal Circuit. The Knogo court recognized the shortcomings of the
Jack Winter case: 6' Jack Winter interprets the duty of candor such that
the patent attorney is reduced to the role of an information conduit
between the inventor and the PTO. 6 But this is an inaccuate portrayal:
the patent attorney's role in prosecution involves extensive analysis of
facts and discretion as to which facts are material. Furthermore, the duty
of candor is not absolute; it extends only to facts which are material. 6
Two other factors not considered in Knogo cast doubt on the Jack Winter
reasoning. First, the reasons which justify the duty of candor certainly do
not support an interpretation as broad as Jack Winter's. The duty of
candor is justified in part by characterizing the examinatian proceeding
157. Jack Winter Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
158. Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
159. Jack Winter's broad interpretation of the duty of candor meant that all infDrmation from the
inventor had to be passed on to the PTO, whether material or not. 50 F.R.D. at 228--29.
160. Knogo gave the duty of candor a narrower interpretation, holding that the duty applied only
to information that was material to patentability. The Knogo court thus recognized that patent
attorneys exercise discretion in the information disclosed to the PTO, that not all information need
be revealed, and that material that need not be revealed may be covered by the attorney-client
privilege. 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 940.
161. Id.
162. Jack Winter, 50 F.RD. at 228.
163. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1995); Knogo, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 941.
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as ex parte. But the proceeding is not truly ex parte; ' 4 it is more of a
hybrid proceeding, combining adversarial and ex parte elements. For
example, examiners can demand documentation from the prosecuting
party that supports the claims if the examiners are not satisfied that the
claims are patentable. Second, there are situations analogous to patent
prosecution-with equally important interests at stake-where privilege
is allowed to defeat a duty of candor. All attorneys are subject to a duty
of candor before the tribunal 65 and a special duty in the case of ex parte
proceedings.'66 There is recognition, however, that the duty of candor
does not vitiate the privilege, even in ex parte proceedings. 67
Under the more persuasive Knogo reasoning, and considering the
extra factors explained above, C2 had a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality and thus C2's information is covered by the attorney-
client privilege.
3. The Quadrant I Case Falls Outside the Crime/Fraud/Tort
Exception to Privilege
In the case where C2's information is private, it clearly falls within the
attorney-client privilege. But does it fall within the crime/fraud/tort
exception? The answer must be no, because the element of intent to
commit a crime, fraud, or tort is not present. 16 The focus of the intent
inquiry is on the culpable intent of the client, but neither C1 nor C2 can
be said to have intent; C2 communicated the information to L, but it
ultimately was immaterial to C2's patent and C2 thus has no duty to
disclose it. Likewise, C1 does not know of the information and has no
duty to search for it, so C1 cannot be said to have any intent to breach the
164. Williams Mfg. Co. v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 121 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1941),
affd, 316 U.S. 364 (1942).
It is true, of course, that in the most strict sense, the granting of a patent is not, except when an
interference is declared, the result of an adversary proceeding, as in usual administrative
determinations of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless, it wears, in the
broader sense, an adversary aspect, since the patent office examination protects the public
against un-merited monopoly, and so the public, as represented by the examiner, is always
impliedly in adversary position to the application just as it is ever a third party to an
infringement suit.
Id. at 277.
165. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a) (1995).
166. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 3.3(d) cmt 15 (1995).
167. See, e.g., LoCascio, supra note 88, at 1215.
168. To come within the crime/fraud/tort exception to the privilege, the client must have culpable
intent in seeking the attorney's services. See Rice, supra note 85, § 8:3.
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duty of candor and commit fraud upon the PTO. 69 Although L, as Cl's
lawyer, knows the information, L's knowledge of C2's information
cannot be imputed to C1. 7 '
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that C2's information is subject
to disclosure against C1 under the duty of candor. Where C2's
information is publicly known, privilege does not protect the information
because C2 does not have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality; L
would have to disclose the information against C1, albeit without
disclosing C2's actual communication. But where C2's information is
private, it is protected by the attorney-client privilege because it meets all
the requirements for the privilege and falls outside the exception. Thus,
there is a direct conflict between the duty of candor and the attorney-
client privilege. Policy considerations, discussed in the following section,
dictate that attorney-client privilege override the duty of candor.
E. Policy Analysis of the Privilege Issue
The quadrant II situation falls squarely within the scope of the
privilege, outside the crime/fraud/tort exception, and within the duty of
candor. Therefore, the decision whether to recognize privilege as a
defense in this situation can be based only upon a finding that the policy
objectives of the privilege supersede those of the duty of candor. Several
public policy considerations support recognition of the privilege as a
defense to charges of inequitable conduct for failure to diszlose material
information.
First, denial of the privilege in this situation ignores Ihe inventor's
interests. The PTO is charged with looking out for both the interests of
the inventor and those of the public,' but the duty of candor only takes
the public and the PTO into account.' The inventor's interest is in
obtaining all patent rights to which the inventor is entitled, and quality
legal representation is important to ensure that this occtus. To ensure
quality legal representation, the inventor must have freedom of choice of
counsel. The inventor's freedom of choice of counsel is an important
169. The duty of candor does not impose an affirmative duty to search for meterial information,
and only requires disclosure of information that is both known to exist and known to be material. 37
C.F.R. § 1.56(a); see also discussion supra part I.C.I.
170. Glaxo v. Novopharm, 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 516 (1995).
171. See generally 5 Chisum, supra note 7, § 19.03.
172. See discussion supra part .C.
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right " that would be seriously curtailed if the inventor was forced to
choose counsel based on whether the attorney might be forced to disclose
immaterial confidential information. The inventor's choice of counsel
should be based on the attorney's legal competence, not fear of
disclosure.
Second, denial of the privilege puts both the attorney and inventor in
awkward positions: because of the possibility of disclosure to a third
party, they are forced to guess information about each other that they
could not possibly know, even before deciding whether representation is
appropriate. The client must know in advance everything that must be
disclosed to the attorney, and also must guess who the attorney's other
clients are and what their inventions are. The inventor probably does not
know this information, and the attorney certainly cannot reveal
information about other clients because of the duty of confidentiality.
Likewise, the attorney is forced to guess what the inventor might say that
will be material to other clients' patents. The inventor and attorney can
only know this type of information after disclosure, but at that point it is
too late: the inventor will have revealed confidential information and the
attorney must disclose it against other clients, even if the attorney
declines representation of this inventor. If the privilege attached, the
attorney simply could decline representation without prejudicing the
inventor's confidentiality.
Third, the very virtue attorney-client privilege seeks to promote-
open communication between attorney and client-is especially
important in patent law because of the difficult and arcane technical
subject matter of patents. The patent attorney must thoroughly
understand the invention and all its technical nuances to be able to
distinguish the invention from the prior art; sometimes the invention will
differ from the prior art in very subtle, yet meaningful, ways. Although
all patent attorneys are scientists or engineers, they usually are not
experts in any given technology. The clients are the experts, and they
must "teach" their inventions to the attorneys. This may require
consideration of large amounts of technical background information, not
all of which will be material to the resulting patent. If inventors feel
constrained in what they can tell their attorney for fear of disclosure, they
may not adequately teach the invention to the attorney and may forfeit
patent rights to which they are entitled.
173. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Fourth, denial of the privilege contravenes the constitutional mandate
of the patent system because it discourages inventors from pursuing
patents on inventions that may be the subject of other types of protection,
such as trade secret law. 74 Denial of the privilege in this situation places
inventors in a position where they must guess about the patentability of
their own inventions. Unless they are familiar with patent law, they are
unlikely to guess correctly, and if they guess wrong they may lose all
protection. An example will illustrate the concept. Suppose a first client
has a trade secret invention and wants to patent it. As the name implies,
trade secret law requires that the invention be kept secret. The first client
takes the invention to the lawyer; the invention is not patentable, but it is
material to the patent application of the lawyer's second client. If
privilege does not apply, the lawyer must disclose the invention to the
PTO because it is material to the second client's patent, but the first
client will lose all protection for its invention because it is not patentable
and it is no longer secret.
Fifth, denial of the privilege creates a conflict of interest where one
might not otherwise exist. If C2's information is material to Cl's patent,
the attorney may purposely draft Cl's patent in such a way that C2's
information will not have to be disclosed. This situation places the
attorney in a conflict of interest that would not exist i:f the privilege
applied.' It could also result in C1 getting less patent :ights than C1
deserves.
Finally, denial of the privilege actually may contravene some of the
objectives that the duty of candor is supposed to promote. Denial of
privilege discourages fall and complete communication between the
inventor and attorney. Complete communication could result in more
accurately drafted patent applications that save PTO resources, as less
effort may be required for any given application.
Therefore, in simultaneous representation cases where material
information also falls within the attorney-client privilege, the privilege
should be recognized and allowed to override the duty of candor.
Application of the privilege does not necessarily contravene the policies
174. The constitutional mandate is "[to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8. At least one court has recognized the problem of
protecting trade secrets that turn out to be unpatentable. See In re Sarkar, 575 F.2d 870 (C.C.P.A.
1978) (granting motion to seal record and hear oral argument in camera to protect trade secret if it
should be unpatentable).
175. The attorney faces a conflict of interest because representation of C2 limis the representation
of C1. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1995); see also supra nrte 151.
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of patenting,'76 and numerous policy reasons support recognizing the
privilege in such simultaneous representations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's recent Molins decision suggested, but did not
resolve, an important issue of PTO procedure that could affect the
substantive rights of inventors seeking patents. The issue is whether,
when a patent attorney simultaneously represents two clients seeking
patents in closely related technical fields, the attorney can use the
attorney-client privilege to avoid disclosure of confidential information
received from one client when that information is material to the other
client and thus must be disclosed under the provisions of the PTO's duty
of candor.
The application of attorney-client privilege to patent prosecution has
been inconsistent. The more persuasive and better reasoned approach
places the information disclosed to the attorney by the first client
squarely within the privilege, at least if the information is not publicly
known and is not material to the first client's patent. But if that same
information is material to the patent of the lawyer's second client, the
PTO's duty of candor requires that the lawyer disclose it. Because the
information falls within the ambit of both privilege and candor, the
decision as to which one prevails must be based upon policy
considerations. Numerous policy considerations support the position that
privilege should override candor when there is a conflict between the
two.
The issue suggested by Molins creates destructive uncertainty for both
attorneys and their clients. It puts both in a position where they must
guess whether or not confidential communications will be protected by
privilege, and both stand to lose if they guess incorrectly. The Federal
Circuit has the power to resolve this issue, and should do so at the first
possible opportunity.
176. See Hogan v. Natta, 410 F.2d 187, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1969).
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